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THE IMPACT OF THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985 ON
U.S.  WHEAT EXPORTS
Kenneth W. Bailey
Abstract  study and others suggest that the high value of
A major objective of the Food Security Act of  the U.S. dollar coupled with inflexible loan rates
1985 was to make the United States more com-  created a "price umbrella" under which foreign
petitive in world markets. U.S. wheat exports  countries expanded areaplanted and production
in 1987/88 were 75 percent above their 1985/86  of grains  (Thompson;  Salathe  and  Langley).
level. This paper analyzes  the change  in U.S.  Thisexpansion,togetherwitha world recession
competitiveness  in wheat exports by quantita-  and  an  international  debt  crisis,  resulted  in
tively  assessing those  factors responsible  for  declining  U.S.  sales  and  market  share  in  a
this export expansion. The results indicate that  shrinking world market.
about half of the increase  can be attributed to  One  of the  major  objectives  of the  Food
the provisions of the 1985 Act. About 40percent  Security Act of 1985 was to make the United
of the increase is due to nonprice factors in the  States more competitive in world grain markets.
Soviet  Union  and China-namely  production  Two important changes  in this direction  have
shortfalls and domestic policies-that increased  been  (a) greater downward  flexibility  in loan
import  demand.  The  rest is  due  to  reduced  rates, and (b) an ability to reduce  Commodity
competitor yields.  Credit Corporation (CCC) loan forfeitures and
reduce Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) and CCC
Key words: wheat exports,  simulation model,  stock levels  when the market price  is below
farm policy, export bonus.  release levels.  The 1985 Act has provided the
A major theme  throughout  the  Congres-  Secretary  of Agriculture greater discretion in
sional debate on the Food Security Act of 1985  settingloanratesand export bonuslevelsunder
(1985 Act) was the loss of U.S.  export market  the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). The
share  to competitor countries.  U.S. wheat ex-  more  flexible  loan  rate  formula  and
ports fell by almost 50 percent from a high of  implementationoftheFindleyAmendmenthave
1.77  billion  bushels in  1981/82  to  915  million  substantially lowered the loan rate. The EEP,
bushelsin1985/86(USDA, 1988).TheU.S. share  in  conjunction  with  CCC  export  credit
ofthe world wheat export market fell from 48 to  guarantees  (GSM-102  and  GSM-103),  has
29 percent over this same period. One hypothe-  lowered  the  U.S.  export  price  in  targeted
sis is that U.S. agricultural export embargoesin  markets.2 These discretionary  measures were
the  early  1970s  resulted  in  declines  in  U.S.  implemented  under the  assumption  that  the
exports and farm prices and income in the 1980s.1 elasticity  of import  demand  facing  the  U.S.
Embargoes  undermined  U.S.  credibility as  a  market is of such magnitude that a reduction in
supplier  and  encouraged  competitor  produc-  the  U.S.  export  price  will  expand  both  the
tion  under  this  hypothesis.  This  hypothesis,  quantity and  value of U.S. exports.  The  1985
however, has been challenged by a study com-  Act has also allowed for the issuance of generic
missioned by the Economic Research  Service  certificates  in  lieu  of  cash  payments  to
which concluded that embargoes did not cause  participating producers, export merchants, and
the farm crisis of the 1980s (USDA, 1986). This  commodity  groups  (Glauber).  Exchanges  of
1 See Abbott et al. for a brief description of this hypothesis.
2 For a detailed description of the Export Enhancement Program and CCC export credit programs, see Smith (1987,  1988).
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117these certificates have resulted in reduced CCC  presented in Bailey (1988, 1989).
loan forfeitures and  a drawdown  of FOR  and
CCC stock levels.  Model Specification
U.S.  wheat  exports have increased  signifi  The world wheat trade model is conceptual-
cantly  since  implementation  of the  1985  Act.  ized below and  in Figure 1. Six equations  de-
Exports have expanded 75 percent from  1985/  scribe  the  behavior  of major  exporters  and
86 to an estimated 1.6 billion bushels in 1987/88.  importers, and the world market clearing con-
The purpose  of this  article  is to quantify the  ditions.
degree of this expansion that can be attributed  (  (P  AP  pe* 
to the 1985 Act. An understanding of the major  (1) ES  j,(P)=  AP  + Sj,t-i
factors responsible  for this export expansion  - DDj,t(Pj,)  - STj,tPj,,
will provide policymakers greater information  (2) Pe  = p
on the response of U.S. wheat exports to changes  (3) pJt  bER*P
in U.S. farm policy.  (3)  aj,  +  j,t*j,t* ust
(4) EDi,t(P,t) = DDt(Pt) + STt(Pt) AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL OFt  - - SY  S
THE WORLD WHEAT MARKET  - i,(  i,t - ,t-
An econometric simulation model ofthe world  (5) P  i  = Pi,t-
wheat economy was used to assess those factors  (6)  Pi  = ai  + bt*ERi  *PUs,  and
that  have  expanded  U.S.  wheat  exports.  A  (i,*  t  ESt (u 
dynamic  nonspatial  equilibrium  model  was  (7)  suchthat  Ej,(P
employed. Nonspatial equilibrium models solve  - EDit(Ps,t) - ROWt = 0,
for the net trading position of each country and  where:
for one  equilibrium  world  price;  they do  not  ES = wheat excess supply,
solve for multilateral trade flows between coun-  P = border price,
tries. The model used in this paper focuses  onP  =  et area p  ed
the behavior of the world's major wheat export-  P  = wheat expected
ers-the United States, Canada, the European  YL =  wheat yield,
Community, Australia, and Argentina.  It also  = wheat endi  ,
contains a Japanese submodel, a block of equa-  = wheat  mestic  de
tions representing the rest of the world's major  a = trade margin,
importing  countries  and  regions,  and  world  = exhae  rate co
market clearing  conditions.  An advantage  of  E  = exchange rate curen  f
using this type of model is that it can dynami-  or j relative  to U.S. dollars
cally assess  the impact  of changes  in agricul-  reat  das,
tural policies on world wheat trade. The model  ED = wheat excessdemand,
developed  here represents an improvement to  ROW =  rest ofthe world net trade,
existing trade  models by explicitly  reflecting  j =  subscript for major exporters,
policy  variables  in the  area response,  ending  u  = subscript for maor importers, and
stocks,  and  price  transmission  equations  for  =  United States.
major wheat exporters.  Excess supply for major exporters, equation
Structure  of the world  wheat trade  model  (1),  is  determined via an identity that equals
was patterned after the FAPRI/CARD trade  supply (area planted times yield plus beginning
model (Devadoss et al.). It consists of 78 behav-  stocks) less domestic demand and ending stocks.
ioral equations  and 46 identities and was esti-  Planted area is a function of an expected price
mated over the period  1960-86 using ordinary  and government policy variables. In the United
least squares.  Equations are mostly linear, al-  States, planted area is specified as a function of
though some variables are expressed as ratios.  expected net returns per acre for program and
The complete model documentation,  data, lit-  nonprogram  participants  using  an  approach
erature  review,  and  validation  statistics  are  developed by Bancroft. In Canada and Australia,
3The equations for the rest of the world importers were provided by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State
University, and are part of the FAPRI/CARD  model. These  equations will be published in a forthcoming CARD report. 4The OLS estimation technique may lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when applied to a system of equations
where there exists an independent variable that is in fact endogenous to the system.  Other estimators, such as instrumental variable
and full-information techniques, were initially considered for use in estimating the model. They were not, however, judged to represent
an improvement over OLS since specification error, which increases as a modeling system becomes larger, would affect all parameter
estimates in the system of equations (see Bailey 1988, pp. 118-20).
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EDplanted area is specified as a function of expected  TABLE  1.  MODEL  ESTIMATES  OF OWN-PRICE
pool returns from Canadian Wheat Board and  ELASTICITIES  FOR WHEATa
Australian  Wheat  Board  marketings  (Bailey
and  Goodloe).  In the EC, wheat planting  is a
Area  Feed  Food  Domestic  Ending function  of expected  gross returns  from  EC  Haested  Use  Use  Use  Stocks
market  prices  (Meilke  and  de  Gorter).  The
expected-price for all major exporters, equation  United States  .58b/1.23c  -.97  _d  -.59e
(2),  is  equal  to  the  border  price  lagged  one  Canada  .33  -1.03  -.08  -.25
period since planting occurs well in advance of  EC-10  .77  -1.92  d  - 61 Australia  .13  -2.24  —d  - -.60 the  marketing  year.  The  border  price  is  Argentina  .32  d  d
determined  in  equation  (3)  via  a  price  Japan  .52  - - -.18  --
transmission equation which is linked to a world
reference price, in this case the U.S. wheat Gulf  Note: - = not available.
refeenc  price, i  *•  thi  *  ce  t*  U  *  w  t  a  Short-run elasticities  evaluated  over the  period 1960-86.
ports' price. Domestic prices are conditioned on  bAcreage  planted within  U.S.  commodity programs.
these border prices, as well as on government  cAcreage planted outside U.S. commodity programs.
policies  that act  to limit the  influence  of the  dStatistically insignificant within a  90-percent  confidence  interval.
variation in world prices.  Commercial  ending stocks.
Excess  demand  for major importers,  equa-  through the U.S. market by setting U.S. excess
tion (4),  is determined via  an identity that is  supply  equal  to  the  world  demand  for  U.S.
equal to domestic demand plus stocks less sup-  exports.  This is diagramed in Figure 1 where
ply. The expected price for importers in equa-  EDi  and  ES. represent  excess  demand  and
tion (5) is equal to the border price lagged one  supply schedules in local currencies for world
period, where the latter is determined in equa-  importers and export competitors.  Substitut-
tion (6) via a price transmission equation.  ing the price transmission equations into these
The world market clearing condition,  equa-  schedules then determines EDI and ES. which
tion (7), is satisfied when an equilibrium price is  are denominated in U.S. dollars.  Market clear-
determined  that  sets  world  supply  equal  to  ing conditions are then met when an  equilib-
world demand.  Since the U.S. border price is  rium world price P* is determined that equates
the world reference  price, the model is cleared  U.S.  excess  supply  (ES  ) with the  import
TABLE 2. MODEL  ESTIMATES  OF  CUMULATIVE  DYNAMIC  ELASTICITIES  FOR WHEATa
Simulation Periodb
1  2  3  4  5  40
U.S.  export demand c -0.69  -0.86  -0.85  -0.86  -0.86  -0.79
Excess supply
United States  0.20  0.44  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.44
Canada  0.37  0.41  0.57  0.76  0.96  2.70
Australia  0.21  0.12  0.07  0.04  0.02  0
Argentina  0  0.19  0.46  0.49  0.49  0.49
Excess demand
Japan  0  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02
Soviet Union  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21  -0.21
Other Western  Europed  0  3.54  3.54  3.54  3.54  3.54
Africa &  Middle  East  -0.34  -0.34  -0.34  -0.34  -0.34  -0.34
High-income
East Asia  -0.13  -0.13  -0.13  -0.13  -0.13  -0.13
Other Asia  0  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24  -0.24
aWith respect to a sustained change in  the U.S. wheat Gulf ports price.
bPeriod  1  = 1986/87: short-run elasticity; period 5 = 1990/91: intermediate-run elasticity; and period 40 = 2025/26: long-run  elasticity.
"Elasticity  of demand  for imports facing the United  States with respect to the U.S. wheat Gulf ports price.
dOther Western Europe was a net exporter in  1985.
'The  model solution does not explicitly reflect the imperfect nature of the world wheat market as have other studies (McCalla and
Alaouze et al.). Grennes and Johnson argued, however, that variation in world wheat prices is better explained by government policy
than by changes in market structure.
6This demand function for U.S. wheat is defined as the excess supply from the rest of the world less world import demand.
120demand facing the U.S. market (EDrow), where  was then simulated  over the period  1986/87--
the latter is equal to the horizontal sum of the  2025/26 (40 periods) in order to determine the
excess demand for all importers (EDi) less the  baseline  simulation  path for the  endogenous
excess supply for the non-U.S. world exporters  variables. The model was then shocked by rais-
(ESJ).  ing the wheat Gulf ports' price in 1986/87,  sus-
taining this price over the 40-year simulation
Model Elasticities  period,  and resolving the model.  The result is
The model  elasticities representing  the be-  the  shocked  simulation  path. The  cumulative
havioral characteristics of the major exporters  dynamic elasticities were then computed by (a)
andJapan are presented in Table 1. These short-  computing the percent change in net trade for
run elasticities were computed  from the esti-  each country/region from the baseline  simula-
mated behavioral equations by multiplying the  tion path, and  (b) dividing this change by the
estimated coefficient by the ratio of the mean of  percent  increase  in the Gulf ports' price. The
the independent  variable  to the  mean  of the  results show the period-by-period response of
dependent variable. The results indicate a low  each country and region to a sustained change
own-price elasticity for food use for the world's  in the U.S. wheat export price.
majorwheat exportersThis is not the casefor  The  U.S.  wheat  export  demand  elasticity
Japan,  a major wheat importer,  which  has  a  increases from -0.69 in the first period to -0.86
significant own-price elasticity for food use.  by the fourth period and then declines to -0.79 in
Trade  elasticities  were  computed  for  the  the long run (Figure 2). This result is surprising
excesssupply anddemandfunctions and for the  in that  it  suggests  very  little  change  in  the
demand for U.S. wheat exports (see Table 2).  demand for U.S. wheat exports beyond the first
The method employed earlier to compute elas-  perod. U.S.  wheat excess  supply i  inelastic,
ticities from estimated equations could not be  and the elasticity increases from 0.2 in the first
used  to  estimate  trade  elasticities  since  the  period  to  0.46  in  the  third  period  and  then
world  wheat  model  solves  for  net trade  via  declines  to 0.44 in the long run. This range is
identities,  not  estimated  reduced-form  equa-  comparable to the elasticity of excess supply for
tions.  One  approach  commonly  used  in trade  Argentina. Australian wheat excess supply is
modeling is to first estimate supply,  demand,  highly inelastic since its only link to the world
and  price  transmission  elasticities  for  each  price is through the human consumption  price
country, and then aggregate these via market  which is statistically  insignificant  in the food
shares to compute  excess  supply and demand  use equation. Canadian wheat excess supply is
elasticities and the U.S. export demand elastic-  relatively more elastic and increases from 0.37
ity (Bredahl et al.). This approach,  however, is  in the first period to 2.7 in the long run. This
most commonly used with static trade models  cumulative increase is due to the timing of pool
and is not appropriate for models that have a  payments which occur over more than one year
complex  dynamic structure.  and therefore affect planting decisions beyond
Trade elasticities were therefore  computed  the current crop year. The excess supply of the
in  this  study  by  dynamically  simulating  the  EuropeanCommunityisnotaffectedbychanges
complete modelling system beyond the histori-  in the world price due to the Common Agricul-
cal  period,  and  then  computing  cumulative  tural  Policy  which  isolates  domestic  prices.
dynamic  elasticities.8 Pindyck  and  Rubinfeld  Japanese wheat import demand is only margin-
defined a dynamic elasticity as follows:  ally  responsive  to  the  world  price  since the
Japanese border price has only a marginal impact
(8)  Ep(r)  =  Pt  Qt+r -Qt  on the Japanese  resale price. The rest of the
Qt  dPt  import demand elasticities reported in Table 2
where E is a dynamic elasticity for quantity Q  are  stable  since  the  specifications  for these
with respect to price P, dP t is a change in price  importers do not contain any lagged variables.
occurring in period t, and Qt+r -Qt is the change
in quantity overr periods. Using this definition,  Model Validation
the elasticities presented in Table 2 were com-  The model was dynamically simulated over
puted as follows. First, all exogenous variables  the  period  1968-85  in  order  to  compare  the
were  fixed at their  1985/86  levels. The model  simulated results to actual values  and to com-
7It should be noted that Argentine and Japanese  wheat food and feed use were combined for econometric estimation.  Feed use,
however, represents  a small percent of domestic  use.
8For a discussion of dynamic elasticities  and multipliers, see Johnston (pp. 8-11) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (pp. 391-401).
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Simulation  Period  (Years)TABLE  3.  SELECTED VALIDATION  STATISTICS  OF  tively  high  (35.3  and  29.4,  respectively).  The
THE  WORLD  WHEAT TRADE  MODEL,  validation statistics for these two equations are
1968-85a  important since they represent the cumulative
effects of all of the other endogenous variables.
The results suggest that the model tracks the
MAREb  PTPE  Ad  R-Stred  historical  data well.  The exception  is in a few
years  when  the  simulated  value  of the  Gulf
----  Percent ----  ports' price appears to be exceeding the actual
United States  value. One explanation  for this is that the ap-
Program  area  .071  17.65  90.56  proach employed to convert the foreign excess
Nonprogram  area  .234  29.41  93.00  supply and  demand  schedules to a June/May
Food  use  .012  41.18  79.93  crop year does not accurately reflect the proper
Feed  use  .335  17.65  90.81  timing of actual export shipments.
Seed  use  .075  29.41  99.40
Ending  stocksd  .113  5.88  77.29  SIMULATION  PROCEDURES
Net exports  .134  35.29  -
Gulf ports price  .147  29.41  - The model  was simulated  over the ex post
Canada  forecast  period  1986/87-1988/89.  A  baseline
Area harvested  .044  17.65  94.16  scenario was constructed  by adding  Baseline
Food  use  .012  23.53  92.37  Adjustment  Factors  (BAF's)  to  individual
Feed  use  .099  41.18  79.75  equation  intercepts  in  order  to  reflect  the
Seed  use  .054  23.53  98.89  USDA's December 1988 Interagency Baseline
Ending  stocks  .095  29.41  91.18  over this period. The BAF's were computed by
Exports  .100  41.18  taking the difference between the initial simu-
Australia  lated values  of the  endogenous variables  and
Area  planted  .092  11.76  93.62  their baseline values  on a year-by-year basis.
Food  use  .032  41.18  83.58  The BAF's reflect the observed variance in the Feed  use  .428  41.18  60.55
Ending stocks  .788  23.53  86.36  error  structure,  as  well  as  new  information
Exports  .138  17.65  generated over the ex post simulation period.
EC-xpor  13  1Once  the model was adjusted via the BAF's
Area  harvested  .027  29.41  40.70  to reflect the model baseline, the analysis was Area harvested  .027  29.41  40.70
Food  use  .011  47.06  85.02  accomplished  using  the  following  three-step
Feed  use  .076  29.41  91.16  approach. First, exogenous variables that are
Ending stocks  .141  29.41  75.92  hypothesized to have contributed to the expan-
Net exports  1.502  35.29  sion in U.S. wheat exports were shocked one at
Argentina  a time under  each scenario.  This was accom-
Area planted  .071  23.53  75.05  plished by constraining each factor to its 1985/
Domestic  use  .030  29.41  83.64  86 level and rerunning the model over the simu-
Ending stocks  .294  29.41  51.42  lation period  1985/86-88/89.  The year-by-year
Net exports  .301  29.41  difference between the baseline value and each
Japan  shocked  scenario  was then  computed.  If this
Area harvested  .210  11.76  98.59  change  is positive, then an export expanding
Domestic  use  .011  29.41  93.20  factor has been isolated. Second, a "low export"
Ending  stocks  .081  41.18  85.30  scenario was constructed by shocking all of the
Net imports  .027  41.18  exogenous  variables,  or fixing  them at their
a-—~~  Frwetsplueanprcs1985/86  levels, and rerunning the model over
MaForwheat  supply,  use,  and prices,  the simulation period. The difference between
,An=  sly-tI  the baseline level of U.S. wheat exports and the
nil  Yt  I'  "low export" scenario then provided the degree
where y,  is  the actual value in year t, y, is  the  model estimate in  year t, and  of "market expansion" that can be explained by
n  is  the  number  of years in  the historical simulation  period.  all of the exogenous factors. Third, the percent
c  PTPE:  percent turning point error.
dCommercial stocks.  of this market expansion  attributable to each
exogenous factor was then computed. This was
pute measures of goodness of fit (see Table 3).  accomplished by rerunning the model for each
The  Mean  Absolute  Relative  Error (MARE)  exogenous  variable  by  constraining  all  vari-
for U.S. wheat exports (net of imports) and the  ables except the one of interest to its 1985/86
Gulf ports price is less than 0.15, although the  level.  The  difference  in  U.S.  wheat  exports
Percent Turning Point Errors (PTPE) are rela-  between each  of these scenarios  and the "low
123export" scenario  would  then provide an  esti-  ing a country's excess  supply function  to the
mate  of the  direct  effect  of each  exogenous  left, thereby shifting the excess demand func-
variable  on  market  expansion.  Interactions  tion facing the U.S. market to the right. Com-
between exogenous variables could also be iso-  petitor  yields  in  scenario  (1) were  therefore
lated in this manner if the year-by-year sum of  constrained  from falling  below their  1985/86
the individual changes  in U.S. wheat exports  levels.
due to each factor is not equal to the computed  Scenarios (2) and (3) reflect provisions in the
"market expansion."  Food  Security Act  of 1985  that are hypothe-
sized to have expanded U.S. wheat export vol-
Model Scenarios  ume.  The loan rate was  frozen at its  1985/86
Four exogenous factors have been hypothe-  level in scenario (2) in orderto assess the impact
sized to have contributed  to the expansion  in  of a more flexible  loan rate on U.S. wheat ex-
U.S. wheat exports. Scenarios were constructed  ports. The U.S. wheat loan rate provides a floor
to test these factors. They are: (1)  reductions in  for U.S.  and world wheat prices in the model,
competitor yields, (2)  a lower U.S. wheat loan  and also determines minimum support prices in
rate,  (3)  the  Export  Enhancement  Program  Canada  and  Australia.  Loan  rates  and  farm
(EEP), and  (4) factors unrelated to the world  prices forwheat and competing crops, as well as
wheat price that have expanded imports by the  target prices, diversion provisions, and produc-
Soviet Union and China. Factors (1)-(3) above  tion costs, were frozen at  1985/86 levels. CCC
have been viewed by many in the industry as  and FOR stocks were endogenized to support a
responsible for this export expansion.  Factor  $3.30 per  bushel  farm price  in this  scenario.
(4) was isolated in an earlier analysis after it  EEPbonuseswereunalteredinordertoisolate
became apparent that factors (1)-(3) explained  the loan rate effects
less than half of the U.S. wheat export expan-  The impact ofthe EEP on U.S. wheat exports
sion. The depreciation in the value of the U.S.  i  solated  in  scenario  (3).  The  export  bonus
dollar was also  hypothesized to have contrib-  program  was  conceptualized  in  the  model
uted to this export expansion, but was not con-  baseline by expanding the theory of a general
sidered here since bilateral exchange rates are  export payment-in-kind scheme  to the unique
not reflected  in  the  regional  import  demand  case  of  a targeted  program  (Houck;  Bailey,
equations in the world wheat simulation model.  1988, pp  273-79). The EEP bonuses were set
equal to zero in this scenario in order to isolate
Scenario Assumptions  the impact  of this program  on U.S. wheat ex-
port volume.
A major assumption for scenarios  (1)-(4) is  Finally,  scenario  (4)  isolates  those  factors
that  U.S.  government-owned  stocks  are  en-  unrelated to the world wheat price that have
dogenized  so  as to  maintain  the wheat  farm  expanded  import demand in the Soviet Union
price at its baseline level.9 This assumption was  and  China.  Based  on  reduced-form  import
made since FOR and CCC stocks were not fully  demand  functions  for the  centrally  planned
endogenized  in the model.  Generic  certificate  importers estimated usingtime series data from
programs and the weekly CCC wheat auction  1960 to  1985,  the  Soviet  Union  was the  only
program are hypothesized to have been used by  centrally  planned  importer found  to  be price
the CCC to reach targeted year-end  stock lev-  responsive  (CARD). However, because  China
els, which implicitly suggests the existence of a  has exhibited price responsive behaviorinrecent
targeted season average farm price. Given the  years, an implied import demand  elasticity of
complexity with which the CCC stock program  -0.6 was used. 10 Therefore, part of the increase
has been managed under the 1985 Act, it was  in Soviet and Chinese imports was captured in
assumed for all scenarios that CCC plus Farmer  scenario  (2)  and  (3)  by  lower  world  prices.
Owned Reserve (FOR) stocks are endogenized  Scenario (4) then isolates those nonprice factors
so as to maintain the wheat farm price at its  that expanded imports in the Soviet Union and
baseline level.  China and analyzes their effect on U.S. wheat
The objective of scenario (1) is to isolate the  exports. This was accomplished by constraining
effect of reductions in competitor yields on U.S.  the BAF's for the Soviet and  Chinese import
wheat exports. The latter has the effect of shift-  demand functions to 1985/86 levels.
9The exception is scenario (3) which maintained the farm price at the 1985 loan rate level.
"°This elasticity was provided by the Commodity Trade Analysis Branch (CED) of the Economic Research Service. This is similar
to the -0.54 estimate adopted by the USDA for the Trade Embargo/Competiveness  study (Abbott et al.).
124TABLE 4.  MODEL  ESTIMATES  OF FACTORS  Export Enhancement Program
AFFECTING U.S. WHEAT  EXPORTS  The amount of wheat shipped under the EEP
has  increased  from  10  percent  of total  U.S.
Crop Yeara  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89  exports in 1985/86 to 65 percent in 1987/88. The
model results, however,  indicate that some  of
---  Million  Bushels ---  the wheat shipped under the EEP would have
U.S. wheat exportsb  1,003  1,592  1,450  been exported regardless  of the program be-
Low export scenarioc  536  586  840  cause  of the  other  factors  mentioned.  They
Market expansion:  further suggest that total U.S. wheat exports
Bushelsd  467  1,006  610  increased  20 percent  in  1986/87,  7 percent  in
Percent change  (percent)e 87  172  73  1987/88, and an estimated  6 percent in 1988/89
Export change  relative to what would have occurred  without
attributable  to:  - - - - -Percent  - - - - - the EEP. That translates into an export expan-
EEP program  31  19  23  sion of 169 million bushels in 1986/87,104 million
Lower U.S.  loan  rate  35  27  11  in 1987/88, and 83 million in 1988/89.
Lower competitor yields  10  10  25  The ability of the EEP to expand U.S. wheat
Soviet and Chinese  importsg  24  42  41  exports depends  critically on prevailing world
All  four factors  100  100  100  market conditions. World wheat stocks were 34
percent of world consumption 1985/86-up from
aJune/May crop year.  25percentin 1980/81-and competition between
bSource:  USDA (1988).
Model scenario with  all four factors constrained  to their 1985/86  levels.  exporting countries for markets was very keen.
dThe difference in  U.S. wheat  exports between the baseline and the low  Moreover, much of the U.S.'s supply was tied up
eto  t  low exportscenario  in government stocks unavailable to the market. Relative to the low export scenario.
'The  percent of the total change in  U.S.  wheat exports on a  year-by-year  The EEP helped provide the U.S. an advantage
basis attributable to  each factor.  in  this  environment  and therefore  accounted
9  Nonprice factors that have  expanded imports for the Soviet Union  and  for about 30 percent ofthe U.S. export expansion
isolated by the model in 1986/87. Market condi-
tions, however, changed appreciably in 1987/88
as competitor  production  fell  and  Soviet and
SIMULATION RESULTS  Chinese import demand grew significantly due
The results indicate that U.S. wheat exports  to domestic factors. As a result, there was much
have increased 467  million bushels in 1986/87,  less competition between exporting countries
1,006 million in 1987/88, and 610 million in 1988/  for import markets. Despite an estimated four-
89 due to the combination of the following four  fold increase  in estimated EEP bonuses to $1
factors: (a) the Export Enhancement Program,  billion, the EEP accounted forjust 19 percent of
(b) the lower wheat loan rate, (c) reductions in  the  1 billion  bushel  expansion  in  U.S. wheat
competitor yields, and (d) nonprice factors that  exports in 1987/88 (Table 4). Market conditions
expanded imports in the Soviet Union and China  further changed in 1988/89 as U.S. wheat sup-
(Table 4).  plies fell significantly due to generic certificates,
The EEP program, which lowered the U.S.  which drew down government stocks, and the
export price in targeted markets, accounted for  drought.  The drought  also resulted  in  a 40-
about  30  percent  of the  export  expansion  in  percent reduction in Canadian  wheat produc-
1986/87 and about 20 percent in 1987/88-1988/  tion  from the  year  before  to just  16  million
89. The lower wheat loan rate, which dropped  metric tons. The result was continued  strong
U.S. export prices to all buyers, is responsible  competition  between  importers  for available
for about  a third  of the market  expansion  in  world supplies despite a projected  25-percent
1986/87  and  1987/88  and  about  11  percent  in  reduction in Soviet and Chinese imports (USDA
1988/89.  Lower  yields in  competing countries  baseline). As a result, the EEP was not very
accounted  for  10 percent  of the  expansion  in  effective  in generating  additional  U.S.  wheat
1986/87 and 1987/88 and 25 percent in 1988/89.  exports  in  1987/88  and  1988/89  due  to these
Most ofthe increase, however, was due to factors  market conditions.
unrelated  to  the  world  price  that  increased
imports by the Soviet Union and China. These  Wheat Loan Rate
factors  accounted  for about  a quarter  of the  The U.S. wheat loan rate fell from $3.30 per
market  expansion  in  1986/87  and  about  40  bushel in 1985/86 to $2.28 in 1988/89 under the
percent in 1987/88 and 1988/89.  Food Security  Act of 1985. This lower wheat
125loan rate accounted for 35 percent of the market  of this import expansion since 1985/86 was due
expansion in 1986/87,27 percent in 1987/88, and  to the  lower  wheat  loan rate  which  lowered
11 percent in 1988/89.  The lower loan rate re-  export prices  in general  and the  EEP which
sulted in marginally lower competitor produc-  further reduced  U.S. prices  in targeted mar-
tion  and  higher  import  demand.  Harvested  kets. Most of it, however, was due to nonprice
wheat  area  in  export  competing  nations  fell  factors in the Soviet Union and China, such as
only 1-5 percent from what it would have been  poor-quality harvests and changes in domestic
with the higher loan rate despite  significantly  policies. These internal factors accounted for 24
reduced price supports. Generous agricultural  percent of the U.S. export market expansion in
support  programs,  particularly  in  the  Euro-  1986/87, 42 percent  of the increase  in 1987/88,
pean  Community  (EC)  and  Canada,  isolated  and 41 percent in 1988/89.
producers from changes in the world price, thus  Soviet imports  increased  from  15.7  million
leaving  planted  area  unresponsive  to  lower  metric tons in 1985/86 to an estimated 22 million
world prices.  metric tons by 1987/88, and then fell to a pro-
The lower wheat loan rate under the 1985 Act  jected 14 million metric tons in 1988/89 (USDA
also sharply lowered U.S. wheat ending stocks.  baseline).  CARD  estimated Soviet wheat im-
Ending  stocks  fell  17  percent  in  1986/87,  36  port demand as a function of Soviet wheat pro-
percent in  1987/88,  and  57  percent in  1988/89  duction, the U.S.  wheat Gulf ports price (less
from what they would have been under a $3.30  the EEP bonus to the Soviet Union), and hard
loan rate. Maintaining the loan rate at the 1985  currency earnings from crude oil exports. Some
level  would  have  meant  large  forfeitures  by  of the recent import expansion,  however, was
producers to the CCC in order to support the  also due to a poor-quality crop in 1987/88 which
wheat farm  price at $3.30 per bushel. Wheat  increased imports ofbread-quality wheat which
normally produced for export would have con-  were needed to meet domestic food needs. These
tinued to fall into CCC storage under a high and  non-price factors  were originally unaccounted
rigid loan rate.  for by the model. They increased Soviet imports
and were therefore reflected  in this  scenario.
Competitor Production  Factors that lowered the price the Soviet Union
Wheat  yields  in the  EC  and Australia  fell  paid  for imports-namely  lower  U.S. wheat
below their 1985/86 levels in both 1986/87 and  loan rates and the EEPwere accounted  for earlier. 1987/88 due to adverse weather. The drought of  ear  ier 
Wheat imports by China increased from 6.6 1988 accounted  for most  of the drop in Canadian  Wheat imports by Chia increased from 6.6 1988  accounted  for most of the drop in Canadian  million metric tons in 1985/86 to an estimated 15
wheat production from 26 million metric tons in wheat production from 26 million metric tons in  million metric tons in 1987/86 t8,  and then fell to aestimated  15
1987/88 to just 16 million in 1988/89. This short-  mllion metric tonsin 1987/88, and then fell to
fall reduced the amount of wheat available for  projected  13.5  million  metric  tons  in  1988/89
export  from  those  countries,  increasing  the  (USDA baseline).  These higher imports since
demand for U.S. wheat.  1985/86 were due to a growing population, ris-
demn f  . o*  .U.  wing  incomes,  and  falling  stocks.  Recent  eco- Given the magnitude of these yield fluctua-  nomic  reforms  in  China  have  increased  per-
tions, lower competitor yields have had a mini-  sonal  incomes which led in turn  to increased
mal effect on U.S. wheat exports in 1986/87 and  food demand. That higher demand outstripped
1987/88, accounting for just  10 percent  of the  domesticproductionandsharplyloweredstocks.
market expansion isolated by the model. How-  The  Chinese  government  opted  to  meet  in-
ever, the  drought of  1988/89  significantly  re-  creased  domestic  demand  and  offset  rapidly
duced Canadian wheat production while reduc-  e  ^^  ,  1  1  *  *  . duced Canadian wheat production while reduc-  falling  stock levels with  added imports.  It is
ing U.S. wheat yields just 10 percent from the  these nonprice factors which were reflected in
year before. Therefore, the percent of market  this  scenario.  Some  of the  increase  in  total
expansion due to reductions in competitor yields  Chinese imports, however, was due to the price
increased to 25 percent in 1988/89.  B  1  l increased to 25 percent in 1988/89.  effects of lower wheat loan rates and the EEP.
by t  S  U  . China  has become  more  price  responsive  in
Imports by the Soviet  Union and China  recent years and may have taken advantage of
Total imports by the Soviet Union and China  the EEP offers  and  allocated  more hard cur-
increased from 22.3 million metric tons in 1985/  rency reserves to purchase a larger volume of
86 to an estimated  36.5 million metric tons  in  grain in order to rebuild their depleted  stock
1987/88, and then fell to a projected 27.5 million  levels. These price effects, however, were  ac-
metric tons in 1988/89 (USDA baseline). Some  counted for earlier.
126CONCLUSIONS  about a third of the expansion  in U.S. wheat
The U.S. share of the world wheat market fell  exports in 1986/87 and about 20 percent of the
from a high of 48 percent in 1981/82 to 29 per-  expansion in 1987/88 and 1988/89. Although the
cent by 1985/86. This loss of market share was a  amount of wheat shipped under the EEP has
major consideration in the debate for the Food  increased from 10 percent of total U.S. exports
Security Act of 1985. U.S. wheat exports have  in 1985/86 to 65 percent in 1987/88, this analysis
since increased  75 percent from  1985/86 to an  suggests that some ofthe wheat spped under
estimated  1.6  billion  bushels in  1987/88.  The  theEEPwouldhavebeenexportedwithoutthe
results of this analysis show that this expansion  programbecause oftheotherfactors mentioned.
can be attributed to the following four factors:  The effectiveness of the program in expanding
(a) the Export Enhancement Program, (b) the  U.S.wheatexportsfadedin  1987/88and 1988/89
lower wheat loan rate, (c)  reductions in com-  duetochangingmarketconditionsthatresulted
petitor yields, and  (d) factors unrelated to the  in less competition between the worlds maor
world price that have expanded imports in the  exporters  and  more competition between  the
Soviet Union and China  worlds importers.
About 40 percent  of the expansion  in U.S.  Lower  U.S. wheat  loan  rates significantly
wheat exports since 1985/86 is directly attribut-  expanded  U.S.  wheat exports, particularly  in
able to non-price  factors that have expanded  1986/87 and 1987/88,  and significantly lowered
imports by the Soviet Union and China. Roughly  U.S. wheat  ending  stocks.  Lower  loan  rates
half of the expansion in U.S. wheat exports can  made the  United  States  more competitive  in
be  attributed  to policy  changes  in the  Food  world markets and lowered government stocks.
Security  Act of 1985.  These  changes  include  Ending  stocks  fell  17  percent  in  1986/87,  36
lower wheat loan rates, the EEP, and generic  percent in  1987/88, and  57 percent  in 1988/89
certificates that made U.S. government wheat  from what they would have been under a $3.30
stocks available to the market. The balance  of  loan rate. Lower loan rates, however,  did not
the market expansion  is due to reductions  in  significantly reduce planted wheat area in ex-
competitor yields, with 25 percent of the expan-  port competing countries, particularly the EC
sion in 1988/89 due to the drought in Canada.  and Canada, because  of generous agricultural
The EEP program has been responsible  for  policies.
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